How Christian is Christian Mysticism? by Henry, Martin
1 
                                          
Martin D. Henry (ITQ, vol. 64/1, 1999, 29–54) [revised] 
 
 
 
 
 
How Christian is Christian Mysticism?1
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The problem raised by the question: ‘How Christian is Christian Mysticism?’ is 
contained in the combination of the adjective ‘Christian’ and the noun 
‘mysticism’. By talking about ‘Christian mysticism’, one seems to be assuming 
that there is a general religious reality, called ‘mysticism’, and that ‘Christian 
mysticism’ is one variety of it.2 If that were so, what would become of the 
uniqueness of Christianity, in any strong sense? To be what it has always 
claimed to be, namely a final and unsurpassable revelation of God to the human 
race, Christianity cannot allow itself to be subsumed under any general rubric, 
such as ‘mysticism’. 
 
 That is to say, if Christian mysticism were what made Christianity 
Christian, then, assuming mysticism to transcend religious differences, it is 
difficult to see how Christianity could, as a form of mysticism, continue to 
maintain its unique identity. It would surely risk being absorbed and swallowed 
up by a larger reality, thus losing its specific savour, and eventually 
disappearing. Precisely this, of course, is what many feel has already begun to 
happen to it in the modern age, i.e. since the Enlightenment. Perception of such 
a possibility may have been why Karl Barth made the dramatic claim that 
Christianity was not a religion at all, but ‘revelation’ — religion (and mysticism) 
being for Barth3 a human construct, revelation a divine work. 
1 This is a revised version of a paper given at the ‘Colloque Jean Sulivan. Littérature et 
Sources Spirituelles: L’Oeuvre de Jean Sulivan’, held at Maynooth, 16–18 October 
1998. 
2 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s comments in W. Beierwaltes, H. Urs von Balthasar, A.M. 
Haas, Grundfragen der Mystik (Einsiedeln, 1974), 39. 
3 See below, section entitled: ‘Official suspicion of mysticism in Catholicism and 
Protestantism’. 
2 
                                          
 
 Now while it is true that the current semantic range of ‘mysticism’ may 
be so elastic and diffuse as to make the term almost vacuous, it does 
nevertheless appear to belong within the general sphere of religion.4 This point, 
of course, may not have been of much comfort to a Karl Barth, but then not 
everyone would accept Barth’s stark dichotomy between revelation and religion. 
Furthermore, it seems to have been the Christian tradition which popularised at 
least the use of the term ‘mystical’ to cover a particular kind of religious 
experience.5 However, it is undeniable that in more recent times, ‘mystical’ has 
been allowed to cover a multitude of outlooks, remote from its original meaning 
within Christianity. It has served, for instance, to register belief in ‘the realm of 
“what cannot be said”’;6 to express inarticulate, otherworldly longings; to 
suggest a feeling of not quite belonging to this world; more ominously, to 
convey a deep sense of dissatisfaction with, or even resentment towards, the 
world we have to inhabit, thus opening the door to irrationalism.7 And, of 
course, it has also long since acquired a quasi-magical dimension through its 
association with movements like the medieval Jewish cabbala.8
 
4 Cf. Dietmar Mieth, art. ‘Mystik’, Neues Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 3 
(ed. P. Eicher), Munich, 1985, 151. It hardly needs stressing, of course, that ‘religion’, 
and by association ‘mysticism’, stands now in the minds of many for ‘obscurantism’, 
for the ‘unscientific’ and intellectually ‘unserious’. This viewpoint is reflected in, for 
example, Carl Sagan’s loaded characterisation of the clash between the Ionian thinkers 
of the ‘axial age’ and the defenders of traditional religious beliefs, as ‘the confrontation 
of the Ionian scientists with the mystics 2,500 years ago’ (C. Sagan, Cosmos, London, 
1955, 240). Resistance to ‘mysticism’ can come, therefore, from very different quarters, 
as with Carl Sagan and Karl Barth. 
5 Cf. R.P. McBrien, Catholicism (London, 1984), 1085: ‘Historically, the use of the word 
mystical to describe a special religious experience is peculiar to Christianity.’ 
6 W.D. Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein (London, 1968), 27. 
7 Some trace the alleged link between the ‘mystical’ and the ‘irrational’ (and the resulting 
imprecision of the term ‘mystical’), to the age of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). Cf. 
Max Huot de Longchamp: ‘Le mot “mystique” a perdu toute précision depuis que J.-J. 
Rousseau et les romantiques l’ont appliqué à tout l’irrationel souvent prêté à la chose 
religieuse’ (art. ‘Mystique’, in J.-Y. Lacoste, ed., Dictionnaire critique de Théologie, 
Paris, 1998, 774). 
8 The more esoteric sense of ‘mystical’ would appear to have been a guiding force in, for 
example, the thought of the modern German philosopher and literary theorist Walter 
Benjamin (1892–1940), especially in his philosophy of language. Cf. Kolakowski’s 
comments on Benjamin in his Main Currents of Marxism, vol. III, Oxford, 1978, 348: 
‘Gershom Scholem, his close friend and one of the greatest present-day authorities on 
the history of Judaism, emphasizes that Benjamin had at all times a strong mystical 
streak . . . Benjamin had a lifelong interest in the hidden meanings of words, which led 
him to study the language of magic, the cabbala, and the origins and functions of speech 
in general.’ 
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 How loose and dogmatically unconstrained ‘mysticism’ and related terms 
have now become may be briefly illustrated by some random examples. 
Wittgenstein, for example, as just indicated, made some pronouncements on ‘the 
mystical’ towards the end of the Tractatus.9 These have, however, been a cause 
of puzzlement to commentators. On the surface – if they are not sheer 
mystification – they seem to suggest that the most significant truth about the 
world for human beings cannot be expressed in words: a commonplace enough 
idea, though a significant one, which seems in one way or another to have struck 
most modern thinkers in the tradition of Romanticism from Schleiermacher’s 
time (1768–1834) onwards, to say nothing of many previous thinkers. But how 
Christian such an important notion is, is unclear. The same could be said of Fritz 
Mauthner’s ‘godless mysticism’, discussed at the end of his Der Atheismus und 
seine Geschichte im Abendlande (1920–23).10 And it is not entirely surprising, 
given the general direction and tenor of European thought and sensibility since 
the Aufklärung,11 to find the French seer-poet Rimbaud (1854–1891), who had 
violently discarded the Catholicism of his upbringing, described by Paul Claudel 
as ‘un mystique à l’état sauvage,’12 a phrase suggesting a view of Rimbaud in 
search of some transcendent truth beyond the workaday, convention-ruled world 
of most mortals, and beyond the specific doctrines of any religious tradition. A 
rather different, albeit fictional, character, Belacqua, the desultory antihero of 
Beckett’s early More Pricks than Kicks (1934), who leads an apathetic, 
inconsequential existence around Dublin, is seen as ‘a dud mystic’.13 And in his 
whimsical way, Borges uses the term ‘mysticism’ (mística) in a short piece, 
entitled ‘Diálogo sobre un diálogo’, to evoke a quasi-Platonising sense of the 
‘unreality’ of this world and possible existence of another.14
 
 A more sombre dimension of ‘the mystical’ in modern times is the way it 
functions as the obverse side, so to speak, of the coin of scepticism. Thus, Frank 
9 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness 
(London, 1972), 149f.: ‘It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it 
exists [6.44]. To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited 
whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical [6.45]. . . . There 
are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They 
are what is mystical [6.522].’ 
10 Mentioned by Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I, 2, 322. 
11 On this question see, for example, the present writer’s On not understanding God 
(Dublin, 1997), 53–59. 
12 In the ‘Préface’ to A. Rimbaud, Poésies complètes (Paris, 1960), 5. 
13 Quoted by Jean-Jacques Mayoux (Samuel Beckett, Harlow, 1974, 90), who notes that in 
Belacqua ‘Beckett incarnates for the first time his wish for the physical, sentimental and 
mental immobility that should lead to a near-mystic quiet’ (p. 7). The title of Beckett’s 
book is possibly an echo of Acts 26. 14. 
14 See J.L. Borges, El Hacedor (Madrid, 1975), 20. 
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Kermode remarks of the relentlessly analytical Austrian writer, Robert Musil 
(1880–1942), that he is ‘a sceptic to the point of mysticism . . . caught in a world 
in which, as one of his early characters notices, no curtain descends to conceal 
“the bleak matter-of-factness of things.”’15 Yet even this kind of ‘mysticism’ 
seems relatively benign beside the more menacing sense it acquired in relation 
to Heidegger: ‘Heidegger has been called the “mystic of nothingness”, an 
idoliser of nothingness. No wonder he fell completely for the “Revolution of 
Nihilism”, as Hermann Rauschning put it when defining and condemning 
National Socialism.’16 Finally, the spectre of irrationalism is again conjured up 
and closely associated with ‘mysticism’ in a recent critique of postmodernist 
thought by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont. In offering a prediction, at the end of 
their book, of what might follow postmodernism, which the authors consider 
discredited beyond redemption, they write: ‘One possibility is a backlash 
leading to some form of dogmatism, mysticism (e.g. New Age) or religious 
fundamentalism. This may appear unlikely, at least in academic circles, but the 
demise of reason has been radical enough to pave the way for a more extreme 
irrationalism’,17 such a possibility being opened up, in their judgement, by 
postmodernism’s undermining of sane reason. 
 
 These introductory remarks are perhaps sufficient to show that in the 
modern world ‘mysticism’ has become at once a shifting, slippery concept and a 
potentially lethal reality in human affairs. This would tend to corroborate the 
contention that it is truly at home in the sphere of the religious. To see how its 
meaning has changed over time, and to try to assess whether it legitimately 
belongs within Christianity, we can now survey its emergence and 
transformation over the centuries. 
 
 
Origins of ‘mysticism’: scriptural and patristic 
 
 
Linguistically at least, the actual term ‘mysticism’ derives not from an ancient 
Hebrew or Jewish context, but is of Greek provenance. The root element of the 
word, namely ‘mu–’,18 – as in the verb ‘múo’ (‘to close’, either eyes or mouth, 
15 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (Oxford, 1968), 128. Philip Payne describes 
Musil, in A. Bullock and R.B. Woodings (eds.), The Fontana Biographical Companion 
to Modern Thought (London, 1983), 541, as being ‘both neopositivist and mystic’. 
16 Klaus Mann, ‘Die Heimsuchung des europäischen Geistes’ (1949), in Auf verlorenem 
Posten. Aufsätze, Reden, Kritiken 1942–1949 (Reinbek, 1994), 537f. 
17 A. Sokal and J. Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures (London, 1998), 198. 
18 Cf. Santiago Guerra, art. ‘Mística’ in Diccionario Teológico: El Dios Cristiano, dirigido 
por Xabier Pikaza y Nereo Silanes, Salamanca, 1992, 898: ‘The word mystikós is 
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suggesting introspection and the keeping of ‘secrets’ to oneself) – contains the 
notion of ‘something closed’.19 Various words connected with this root occur in 
the vocabulary of Greek mystery religions, not least the word ‘mystery’ itself. 
The linguistically closely associated term ‘muéo’ was used in the mystery cults 
with the meaning: ‘to initiate into the mysteries’.20 As for the notion of 
‘closedness’ itself, it conveys no particular theological or religious meaning 
beyond the traditional idea, found in Greek thought from Parmenides onwards, 
that truth is hard, indeed impossible, to come by through human searching alone. 
It must be ‘disclosed’ or revealed.21
 
 The term ‘mystérion’ is found in a variety of senses in Jewish scriptures 
of the Hellenistic period. In the Book of Daniel, ‘the Aramaic word ráz, 
translated in the Septuagint by the Greek word mystérion, “mystery,” has a 
specialised meaning, denoting primarily that what God has decreed shall take 
place in the future, that is, the eschatological secret to be made known.’22 In the 
Book of Wisdom it occurs with the meaning of a secret cult.23 But often it 
merely has the familiar or popular sense of a secret.24 However, from the 
perspective of Christianity, the term ‘mystery’ is used most significantly in the 
Book of Wisdom to describe the origin and nature of Wisdom itself. For 
Wisdom is presented as the revelation of a mystery, i.e. of divine secrets. Yet 
unlike gentile secret cults, the mysteries alluded to are not reserved to an élite, 
but are to be broadcast to the entire world.25 This notion of Wisdom as being 
both of divine origin or inspiration and hence unfathomable, and yet as being 
designed to benefit the whole world, is a notion that carries over into 
Christianity with the proclamation of the mysteries of the new faith. 
 
derived from the verb myo, which means to close, especially to close the eyes. Its pre-
Christian use is connected with the ritual celebrations of the mystery religions, secret 
initiation ceremonies closed to the non-initiated, in which the mystes received a teaching 
not to be communicated to anyone else. Thus in its origin the term mystikós contains the 
idea of a secret reality accessible only to a minority.’ 
19 Andrew Louth, ‘Mysticism’, in G.S. Wakefield (ed.), A Dictionary of Christian 
Spirituality (London, 1983), 272, henceforth cited as: DCS. This article owes much to 
Professor Louth’s writings. 
20 Dietmar Mieth, art. ‘Mystik’, Neues Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 3 (ed. 
P. Eicher), Munich, 1985, 151. 
21 Cf. Louth, DCS, 272. 
22 David Hill, ‘Mystery’, in B.M. Metzger and M.D. Coogan, The Oxford Companion to 
the Bible (Oxford, 1993), 538. 
23 E.g. Wisdom 14. 15, 23. 
24 E.g. Tobit 12. 7, 11; Judith 2. 2; 2 Maccabees 13. 21; Ecclesiasticus 22. 22; 27. 16f., 21. 
25 See Wisdom 6. 23f. 
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 The rudiments of what was to become the language of Christian 
mysticism are thus to be found already in the Christian Scriptures. Indeed the 
expression ‘mystérion’26 was used to sum up the Christian revelation (as in Rom 
16.25–26 or Col 1.26–27; 2.2).27 As ‘mystery’, the gospel transcended human 
reason and would forever remain hidden or closed from human understanding, 
even in the case of believers.28 Another important aspect of the Christian 
‘mystery’ – and this, superficially, connected it with the pagan mystery 
religions,29 which also drew a sharp distinction between the initiated and the 
uninitiated – was that it had to be protected from unworthy intrusion by those 
unprepared to participate in it. But the ‘secret’ of Christianity was not, as was 
the case with mystery cults, something esoteric, available only to an élite of 
initiates. It was rather in principle universal, and hence to be universally 
proclaimed, even though it always would elude human comprehension. In this 
non-élitist sense of mystery, Christianity was in harmony with the view found, 
26 E.g. Ephesians 3. 9. For this passage, Louth (DCS, 272) gives the translation of the King 
James Version of the Bible (‘fellowship of the mystery’)‚ which seems to rest on a 
faulty Greek reading. A more plausible translation of the now normally accepted Greek 
text would seem to be, literally, ‘the economy of the mystery’, i.e. ‘the [divine] 
dispensation or plan or unfolding or putting-into-effect of the mystery’. 
27 On the vexed question of whether the Christian term ‘mystery’ is rooted primarily in 
Hellenistic or Jewish soil, J.A. Fitzmyer argues that, while the term mystérion of course 
exists in Hellenistic sources, Paul’s use of it owes more to ‘the OT and Jewish 
apocalyptic writings of the intertestamental period’ (The New Jerome Biblical 
Commentary, ed. by R.E. Brown, J.A. Fitzmyer, R.E. Murphy, London, 1993, 1389) 
than to the world of Greek mystery cults: ‘Mystérion is an eschatological term derived 
from Jewish apocalyptic sources; its application to the gospel gives the latter a nuance 
that euangelion alone would not have had, i.e., something fully comprehended only in 
the eschaton’ (ibid.). According to Edward Yarnold, the idea popular at the beginning 
of the twentieth century that St Paul ‘had radically altered the simple message of Christ 
by superimposing on it a theology of redemption and sacrament derived from the 
mystery-cults . . . is now generally admitted to be unfounded, for there is no evidence 
that many of the ideas that St Paul is alleged to have borrowed from paganism were in 
fact current among the gentiles of his time. On the contrary pagan theology may have 
borrowed the ideas from Christianity’ (The Awe-Inspiring Rites of Initiation, Slough 
1972, 56f.). See also below, n. 29. 
28 Cf. Fitzmyer (ibid.): ‘In presenting the gospel as “mystery,” Paul is implying that it is 
never fully made known by ordinary means of communication. As something revealed, 
it is apprehended only in faith; and even when revealed, the opacity of divine wisdom is 
never completely dispelled.’ 
29 It is surely only with considerable modification, therefore, that one could accept the 
lapidary judgement of Camille Paglia when she writes: ‘The sex and violence in 
Christian iconography are an eruption of pagan mystery religion, of which Christianity 
is a development’ (C. Paglia, Sexual Personae, Harmondsworth, 1992, 246), even 
though it is also undeniable that Christian art accommodates ‘sex and violence’ within 
its borders as the New Testament, indeed the whole Bible, does within its covers. 
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as already indicated, in the Book of Wisdom, that divine wisdom was a mystery 
not to be confined to a secret band of initiates, but revealed as a divine, though 
hidden, truth to the entire world. The Jewish wisdom and apocalyptic traditions, 
which Christianity inherited, were thus clearly differentiated from the secret 
cults of the Gentile world whose mysteries were to be and to remain the 
exclusive preserve of their initiates. 
 
 The Christian notion of mystery was further elaborated by the patristic 
authors.30 Indeed to get an accurate idea of what mysticism, classically, means 
in a Christian setting, we must look, in Andrew Louth’s judgement, at how the 
Fathers employed terms like mystérion (mystery) and mystikos (mystic) in their 
writings. Louth differentiates three strands of meaning in the patristic use of the 
keyword mystikos, whose broad scope encompasses both the divine turning to 
the human race in Jesus Christ and the way in which that specific reality 
continues to be made present to Christian believers in history. 
 
 There is, firstly, the hermeneutical sense of mystikos. It was the term used 
to designate the way Scripture should be interpreted, if its real meaning were to 
be disclosed.31 In practice this amounted to allegorical, but not on that account 
extravagant or uncontrolled, exegesis. This became such an ingrained and 
natural method of textual or linguistic interpretation in Christian circles that we 
find St Augustine typically choosing the Latin adverb mystice to describe the 
figurative sense in which he has used the expression the ‘City of God’ in the 
work of the same name.32 Secondly, the term could be applied to the Christian 
30 Cf. the comments in the art. ‘mysticism, mystical theology’, in F.L. Cross and E.A. 
Livingstone (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford, 19973), 
1127 [henceforth: ODCC]: ‘Language connected with “mystery” . . . was widely used in 
the early Church, often in a fairly routine way; the use of such language depends on the 
conviction that Christian doctrine and liturgy involved matters known only by 
revelation, which are incomprehensible to, or which need to be shielded from 
profanation by, outsiders and those insufficiently purified by faith and moral 
conversion. The sacred words of Scripture and the deeds of God recorded in Scripture 
and enacted in the Eucharist contain a “mystic” significance, into which believers can 
be progressively initiated by Christ through the working of the Holy Spirit.’ 
31 Cf. Louis Dupré: ‘The early Fathers applied the term mystical to the reading of 
Scripture insofar as the Gospel of Christ reveals a deeper meaning in the Old Testament 
text’ (The Deeper Life. An Introduction to Christian Mysticism, New York, 1981, 19). 
Arguably this way of reading the Old Testament is anticipated in the New Testament 
itself, as when in Eph 5.32 the term ‘mystery’ is applied seemingly ‘to the exegesis of 
the passage from Gen. 2:24 cited in the preceding verse. Mystery may thus signify the 
“inner meaning” of a passage whose more obvious and literal sense is something other’ 
(C.F.D. Moule, art. ‘Mystery’ in IDB, vol. 3, New York, 1962, 478). 
32 De civ. Dei XV, 1, 453 (Corpus Christianorum edition); reference in Kurt Flasch (ed.), 
Hauptwerke der Philosophie. Mittelalter, Stuttgart, 1998, 28, n.1. Flasch, presumably 
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sacraments, which were also known as ‘mysteries’.33 Thirdly, and finally, the 
expression was used of ‘theology’ itself (i.e. ‘mystical theology’34) to designate 
the specific ‘knowledge’ of God available to those who held and practised the 
Christian faith.35
 
 As Andrew Louth presents the Fathers’ understanding of ‘mysticism’, it 
was then rooted essentially in what they took to be the ‘spiritual’ truth enshrined 
with the popular, contemporary sense of ‘mystical’ in mind, notes that mystice signifies 
here ‘full of spiritual meaning, allegorical, not: “mystical”’. 
33 We just note in passing that, as in the debate over Pauline Christianity (see above, n.27), 
so also in relation to the Christian sacraments, there has been controversy over possible 
connections between gentile mystery cults and the celebration of the Christian initiation 
rites. The tentative answer E. Yarnold gives to the question: ‘were the rites of Christian 
initiation modified in the fourth century in imitation of the pagan mysteries?’, is ‘that 
the rites themselves were hardly influenced but the explanation given of them began to 
emphasize the element of mystery and fear’ (Yarnold, op. cit., 61f.). It would in fact be 
odd indeed, if Christianity – a religion of incarnation – were to have ever remained 
completely, docetically one might even say, unaffected by ambient influences. To say 
nothing of the pastoral need, in the fourth or any century, to make the Church attractive 
to believers in a world offering glamorous or exciting alternatives . . .  
34 The expression ‘mystical theology’ was first used in Christian theology by Dionysius 
the Pseudo-Areopagite (c.500), and it evidently refers in his mind to a more than purely 
intellectual apprehension of divine reality. Indeed for him, ‘our approach to God must 
be entirely governed by His self-disclosure in Christ and in the Bible. In addition to 
“philosophical theology”, which uses clear concepts and arguments, there is “mystical 
theology” which has to do with symbols and ritual (. . . Letters, 9. 1), leading us beyond 
intellectual notions of God to a real union with Him in the “truly mystic darkness of 
unknowing” (Mystical Theology, 1. 3); here the height of the “mystic words” of 
Scripture is apprehended and the “mysteries of theology” are revealed in silence (ibid. 
1. 1). “Mystical theology” does not just persuade us, it acts on us (Letters, 9. 1); in 
submitting to the effects of the Church’s rites, we “undergo divine things” ( . . . Divine 
Names, 2. 9)’ (ODCC, 1127). This aspect of Dionysius’ teaching was to be highlighted 
by St Thomas Aquinas when he stressed the need to ‘suffer divine things’ (et patiens 
divina), as well as to learn about them intellectually, if real theological understanding 
were to be reached (cf. Expositio super Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus II, 4, ad fin., 
quoted by Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, tr. T.A. Carlson, Chicago and London, 
1991, 225, and the following note). 
35 Clearly, these three meanings were interconnected. As Rowan Williams, for instance, 
writes (Teresa of Avila, London, 1991, 143): ‘When the anonymous fifth-century writer 
we know as Denys the Areopagite wrote a treatise on “mystical theology”, he was 
writing about the way in which Christian liturgy displays the “mysteries” of God’s 
action in relation to the created order – the mystery of God going out from the depths of 
the divine nature to create and then to become incarnate in our nature, God binding 
creation together in communion and drawing creation back to its divine source. To 
understand this divine movement is to receive it into yourself in such a way that you are 
taken beyond all words and signs; and this openness or passivity to God’s movement 
(“suffering divine things”) is what “mystical theology” means.’ 
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in the Bible and celebrated in the liturgy. Hence it was inseparable from the 
scriptural interpretation they practised, and it was nourished by their 
participation in the sacramental and communal life of the Church. For the 
Fathers the sacraments have a ‘mystical’ significance in the precise sense that, 
as with Scripture, they introduce believers into the mystery of Christ36 and 
continue to encourage growth in the life of participation in that mystery.37 In 
patristic times, therefore, ‘mysticism’ is not, as the name tends to suggest in the 
modern world, a free-floating, subjectively guided and motivated search for 
some unspecified, transcendent religious goal. Rather it is a submission to the 
transcendent, hidden truth witnessed to in Scripture, and present in the Divine 
Liturgy; and it is driven by a desire for ‘engagement with God . . . an 
engagement in which by the power of the Holy Spirit one is conformed to the 
Image of God, the Son, and so enabled to contemplate the Father.’38
 
 ‘Mysticism’ is then for the theologians of the early Church nothing vague, 
nebulous, or essentially subjective, but on the contrary the most concrete, real, 
objective, and substantial reality in which a Christian can hope to participate. 
For in participating in the mystery of faith the believer, as a member of the 
36 Some patristic authors (e.g. Origen [c.185–c.254], or Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite) 
stress, in Platonising fashion, more strongly than others, the kinship between the human 
soul and the deity, and the final union of man with God through contemplation (Origen) 
or, as with Dionysius, by a process ‘in which the soul, passing beyond the perceptions 
of the senses as well as the reasoning of the intellect, is united with the “ray of divine 
darkness” and comes to know God though unknowing’ (ODCC, 485). Others, by 
contrast, (e.g. Athanasius [c.296–373], or Maximus the Confessor [c.580–662]) place 
more emphasis on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and the Fall of man within creation, 
and the consequent need for the divine Logos to be made flesh in Christ, so that we 
could be divinised (cf. A. Louth, art. ‘Mystik II’, Theologische Realenzyklopädie, vol. 
XXIII, Berlin, 1994, 553f., 559ff., henceforth cited as: ‘Mystik II’). 
37 This sense of ‘mystical’ seems to have been more deliberately and consciously 
preserved and fostered in the Eastern than the Western Church, judging, if one may, 
from the apparently larger and more dramatic role liturgy plays in the life of the Church 
in the East than in the West, and also from such ‘straws in the historical wind’ as, for 
example, the writings of St Nicholas Cabasilas (b. c.1322), described in the ODCC 
(259) as a ‘Byzantine mystical writer’, who in ‘his principal work, a set of seven 
discourses “Concerning the Life in Christ”, . . . explained how, through the three 
mysteries of Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist, spiritual union with Christ was 
to be achieved. He also wrote an “Interpretation of the Divine Liturgy”.’ There is a 
striking contrast also between the modern tradition of critical theology in the West, as 
opposed to the East. And some would see the roots of even Western critical theology in 
the kind of (subjective) mysticism characteristic, seemingly, of Western, as opposed to 
Eastern, Christianity. German Pietism, with its contribution to the German Aufklärung, 
would be highly significant in this regard. 
38 Louth, DCS, 272. See also, for the term ‘mystical’ in the patristic period, Balthasar’s 
observations in Grundfragen der Mystik, 42f. 
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Church, has the promise of enjoying an incomprehensible union with God. The 
union, even when enjoyed, still remains incomprehensible,39 since it is union 
with the incomprehensible God, and to that extent it can be thought of as ‘secret’ 
or ‘hidden’ or ‘concealed’, terms frequently occurring in discussions of 
‘mysticism’, though not always in the sense intended by the Fathers. 
 
 
Patristic mysticism and Platonism 
 
 
The Hellenistic culture in which the early Fathers attempted to express their 
beliefs was a culture intellectually shaped, above all, by Platonism, The latter’s 
relation to Christianity has been a subject of interminable debate.40 What is of 
foremost importance, however, for the meeting of Christianity and Platonism, is 
that, when it occurred, ‘Platonism “was characterized by its predominantly 
religious and theocentric world view . . . Second-century Platonism is 
theological and otherworldly.”’41 This so-called Middle Platonism ‘was 
“mystical”; it was concerned with the soul’s search for immediacy with God, a 
concern which was intensified with Plotinus and neo-Platonism.’42 Platonism 
had therefore changed since the days of Plato, or at least its religious, more than 
its ethical or political, dimension seems to have been predominant, when the 
Fathers began using it as a vehicle for their thought. 
 
 The fact that the Fathers were influenced by a strongly mystical form of 
Platonism has led some commentators to say that their mysticism is simply 
Platonism. Nietzsche on one occasion rather rudely described Christianity as 
‘Platonism for “the people”’.43 But calmer spirits seem to accept the heart of the 
charge with equanimity. For Père Festugière ‘the mysticism of the Fathers is 
pure Platonism.’44 Others, of course, do try to refute the accusation, seeing any 
form of mysticism as an intruder in the house of Christian faith.45
39 Cf. the comment in the ODCC (art. ‘mysticism, etc.’, 1127) on the early Church’s 
understanding of Christian revelation: ‘The mystery of God remains mysterious even in 
its revelation, so that we need to “hear the quietness” of Jesus as well as receiving His 
word (Ignatius, Eph. 15).’ 
40 Cf. A. Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford, 1981), xii 
[henceforth: Origins]. 
41 Ibid., xiii, quoting R.E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (reprint, 
Amsterdam), 123. 
42 Louth, ibid. 
43 In the ‘Preface’ to Beyond Good and Evil, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1990), 
32. 
44 Louth, Origins, 191. 
45 Anders Nygren is a case in point, raised by Louth, Origins, 192. 
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 To limit ourselves to the mysticism of the Fathers, there is in fact strong 
evidence to suggest that identifying patristic mysticism with Platonism tout 
court is a distortion of the facts. Andrew Louth gives the following reasons46 for 
rejecting such a simplistic equation: firstly, ‘For the Platonists God is an 
impersonal (or supra-personal) ultimate principle; for the Fathers God is a 
Person’ (195). Correspondingly, the Fathers have a stronger ‘concept of grace’ 
and a livelier sense than the Platonists that God’s search for man outweighs the 
human desire to ascend to God, indeed is its cause. Secondly, the Christian 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo rules out the Platonist idea of the soul’s ‘innate 
divinity’ (197), so that ‘the fundamentally creaturely mode of divinization 
proper to humanity’ was a concern to be urgently tackled by (some) Patristic 
writers that has no ‘parallel in Platonism’ (197). It is in this context that the 
theme of Divine Darkness first makes its appearance in Christian thought, with 
Gregory of Nyssa (c.330–c.395) and Dionysius, and again there is no equivalent 
in Platonism (197).47 Thirdly, and finally, as regards the relationship between 
mysticism and morality, ‘For the Platonists the moral virtues are the ways in 
which the soul controls the body so as to be as free from it as possible . . . But 
within Christian theology the moral virtues are the fruits of the Spirit, the 
evidences of the indwelling of Christ in the soul of the Christian’ (198). 
Festugière’s charge, in this area, that a typically Platonist-inspired spirituality 
(which he attributes to some of the Fathers) sees moral action as merely a road 
to the goal of contemplation, and is thus un-Christian, Louth answers by 
pointing out that a true understanding of moral virtues in the Christian life does 
not see them ‘as means to purify the soul so that it can contemplate, but as the 
fruits of the indwelling Christ’ (198). 
 
 At least an arguable case can, thus, surely be made for refuting the 
accusation that patristic mysticism has no profound connection with 
Christianity. But that is only to look at one side of the matter, important though 
it obviously is. We recall that the issues we have just been treating arose from 
the observation that the Platonism the Fathers encountered had a strongly 
mystical slant. What, however, about Christianity itself in the patristic period? 
46 Origins, 195ff. 
47 The great Plotinus scholar, Paul Henry, S.J., remarks too on the (for him) surprising 
‘absence of the notion of “darkness”’ in Neoplatonic mysticism (Plotinus, The Enneads, 
tr. S. MacKenna, abridged with an intro. and notes by J. Dillon, Harmondsworth, 1991, 
lxxxii). His conclusion upholds the genuinely biblical origin of Christian mysticism: ‘If 
the influence of Plotinus on the Christian mysticism of the West and of the East was 
incalculable, it remains true nevertheless that the principal and specific source of 
Christian mysticism is the Biblical Revelation’ (ibid., lxxxiii). 
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Had it changed since its earliest days? This question deserves to be aired too, 
and we shall return to it in our concluding observations. 
 
 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite and medieval mysticism 
 
 
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite was the harvester of the ‘patristic mystical 
heritage’,48 which was subsequently handed on to the Middle Ages. In general 
terms, it could be said that the Dionysian corpus functioned as a kind of charter 
for medieval Christian ‘mysticism’, a charter that was to enjoy, however, a wide 
range of interpretations. Some writers saw the climax of the mystical life – 
union with God – in affective terms, others in terms of will and knowledge, but 
knowledge of a non-intellectual kind, still others in intellectual terms (but where 
the intellect was supernaturally illuminated), and finally others in what one 
might describe as a union between God and the substance of the human soul.49
 
 In the Dionysian writings themselves one can perceive the three levels of 
meaning of ‘mystical’ already outlined in relation to Scripture, the sacraments, 
and the knowledge of God pursued and described in ‘mystical theology’.50 
‘Pursued’ is, though, perhaps not quite the right word since, according to 
Louth,51 what the soul really desires is to pass beyond the ‘signs and concepts’ it 
employs in trying to understand the mystery of God’s love for us in Christ, so as 
finally to be ‘grasped’ by God and transformed by and into divine love itself. 
 
 There also appears in Dionysius the pre-Christian triad of purification, 
illumination, and union, which was already familiar to the devotees of the Greek 
mystery religions, and had been built firmly into the structure of Neoplatonism. 
But it was now given a new interpretation by Dionysius in line with Christian 
48 Louth, DCS, 273. 
49 Cf. ODCC, 1128: ‘Medieval Western interpreters of Dionysius tended to see “mystical 
theology” as leading, through the purgative and illuminative ways, to a loving union 
with God at the peak of our affectivity . . . , in which all intellectual operations are left 
behind. Thus some writers locate “mystical theology” entirely in the will and the 
affections. Others combine this doctrine with the Augustinian tradition that “love itself 
is knowledge” . . . , and maintain that “mystical theology” imparts a special kind of 
knowledge of God not attainable by ordinary intellectual operations. Both views find 
supporters among the Franciscans. Other theologians, especially Dominicans, held that 
“mystical theology” is precisely the ascent of the intellect, enlightened by faith, to union 
with God. J. Gerson [1363–1429] argued that “mystical theology” concerns neither the 
will nor the intellect, but a union with God in the essence of the soul (Ep., 55).’ 
50 Cf. above n.34 and n.35. 
51 DCS, 273. 
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faith, and was subsequently to find its way into the medieval Summas.52 Thus, 
through ‘purification’ the soul seeks to overcome the effects of the Fall on the 
human will and intellect, ‘illumination’ occurs as the soul begins to live in the 
sphere of grace, and ‘union’ refers to the restoration of man to ‘the life of 
Paradise’. The quality of this final stage is suggested, as Louth points out,53 by 
the use of the same term to describe it (teleíosis) as had served to indicate the 
‘perfection’ or ‘fulfilment’ attained by Christian martyrs in death. 
 
 Dionysius’ influence was, for many reasons,54 stronger in the Greek East 
than in the Latin West, where it was exercised mainly55 through translations of 
his Mystical Theology. Since this was often taken in isolation from the rest of his 
writings, it meant that his influence from the twelfth century onwards, when the 
work became widely available and enjoyed enormous prestige,56 was rather one-
sided and moved mystical interest in a subjective direction.57 For, the Mystical 
52 Cf. Balthasar, Grundfragen der Mystik, 54. 
53 ‘Mystik II’, 549. 
54 See A. Louth, Denys the Areopagite, London, 1989, ch. 7. 
55 Though not exclusively: Hugh of St-Victor (d. 1142), for example, wrote a commentary 
on the Celestial Hierarchy of Dionysius, ‘qui joua un grand rôle dans la diffusion de la 
pensée dionysienne en Occident’ (Jean Jolivet, art. ‘Saint-Victor (École de)’, in Jean-
Yves Lacoste, ed., Dictionnaire critique de Théologie, 1042). At a later stage, another 
member of the school of St-Victor, Thomas Gallus (d. 1246), ‘compiled glosses of the 
“Celestial Hierarchy” and “Mystical Theology” and more substantial commentaries on 
both these works and on the “Divine Names”; his most influential work was an 
Extractio or synopsis of the whole Dionysian corpus, which came to be included in the 
Dionysian corpus used in the University of Paris’ (ODCC, 1617). 
56 It had, of course, along with his other writings been translated into Latin twice in the 
ninth century (by Hilduin of St-Denis and by Scottus Eriugena), but those translations 
had not been immediately influential. Of the translation by Hilduin, Louth writes that it 
was ‘so bad as to be unintelligible’ (A. Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 121). Eriugena’s 
translation was a reworking of Hilduin’s. Eriugena also wrote a commentary on 
Dionysius’s Celestial Hierarchy, and a partial commentary on the Gospel of John as 
well as developing his own speculative system in the Periphyseon or De Divisione 
Naturae. He was the main channel through which a ‘mystical philosophy’ was 
conveyed to the West (cf. Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 563). 
57 Louth argues that a comparison between Dionysius’ Mystical Theology and 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy shows that the former was in fact concerned ‘with the inner 
meaning of the sacramental rites’, and hence that ‘mysticism’ for Dionysius is bound up 
‘with the hidden (mustikós) sense of Scripture, the sacraments and the life of the 
baptised Christian.’ Dionysius did indeed use Neoplatonist language and concepts 
(which in themselves could conceivably be construed as inclining religious belief in an 
introspective direction), but he was attempting to express the ‘Fathers’ common 
conviction about the hidden dimension of the human encounter with God, especially as 
this takes place in the liturgy’. Dionysius, Louth holds, would certainly have been 
surprised by the way his writings were used, especially in the West, to turn him into the 
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Theology of Dionysius was ‘an account of the soul’s movement beyond symbols 
and concepts into the darkness where God is known in an ecstasy of love.’58
 
 
The move to subjectivity  
 
 
Louth suggests that the lurch towards subjectivity within mysticism from around 
the twelfth century is symptomatic of a wider pattern of change that can be 
observed in medieval culture, though it was destined to continue long after the 
Middle Ages had come and gone.59 It was a change characterised, as many 
commentators have pointed out,60 by the emergence of the individual and a 
growth of interest in the interior life of human beings. The roots of 
individualism, introspection, and interiority in Western culture are, of course, 
much older than the age of St Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153). Indeed they 
reach back at least as far as St Augustine.61
 
‘Father of a “mystical theology”’, in which ‘extraordinary, inexpressible inner 
experiences’ (Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 560) were seen as the heart of the matter. 
58 Louth, DCS, 273. It is of some interest to note in passing that the author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing translated ‘Mystical Theology’ as ‘Hid Divinity’, correctly in Louth’s 
estimation (see Denys the Areopagite, 125). 
59 How naturally ‘mysticism’ is now thought of in individual or subjective terms scarcely 
needs to be laboured. To take just one example, in connection with Wittgenstein’s 
references to ‘the mystical’ towards the end of the Tractatus, mentioned earlier, G.E.M. 
Anscombe observes unproblematically: ‘“Mysticism” . . . in popular language . . . 
suggests extraordinary and unusual experiences, thoughts and visions peculiar to an 
extraordinary type of individual” (An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, second 
ed. rev., New York, 1965, 169f.). 
60 See, for example, Norman F. Cantor, Inventing The Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1991), 
337: ‘We now know that the most important development in medieval culture was not 
continuity with classical antiquity or perpetuation of the theology of the Church Fathers 
but rather innovative trends in imagination and feeling in the period from about 1080 to 
1230 that may be called the romantic revolution and the discovery of the individual.’ 
With specific reference to Dante, D.L. Edwards notes ‘that all the punishment, in hell or 
in purgatory [in La Divina Commedia], is tailor-made to fit the individual’s outstanding 
sin, for the birth of purgatory in Dante’s imagination belongs to the general movement 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which has been called the “birth of 
individualism”’ (Christianity. The First Two Thousand Years, London, 1997, 258). R. 
Tarnas (The Passion of the Western Mind, London, 1996, 194) also finds the 
‘expression of a deepening individualism’ in ‘Dante’s epic’. 
61 Cf. Louth: ‘[I]n the twelfth century . . . Western theology had begun to develop its own 
characteristic emphases (though many of them can be traced back to St Augustine: the 
appreciation of inwardness, for example) . . .’ (Denys the Areopagite, 125f.). 
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 As the Middle Ages advanced,62 the tendency towards introspection only 
intensified and coloured mysticism accordingly. In the rise of a more 
subjectively oriented mysticism, Louth sees Bernard of Clairvaux and the 
Victorines (of the Abbey of St-Victor in Paris, founded in the twelfth century), 
as pivotal figures, and Teresa of Ávila in the sixteenth century as in some sense 
its culmination.63 Typically in Western, as opposed to Eastern Christianity, as 
Jaroslav Pelikan observes, ‘the Dionysian strains were blended with the 
Augustinian, most notably in its best-known medieval expression, the Christ-
mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux’.64
 
 However, the growth of individualism not only encouraged a subjective 
mysticism, it also fostered – ominously – from about the twelfth century 
onwards ‘a certain anti-intellectualism and thus an incipient split between 
theology and spirituality.’65 This anti-intellectual mood among some religious 
thinkers was exacerbated by the growth of the universities, despite the efforts of 
Dominican theologians like St Albert the Great and his most illustrious pupil, St 
Thomas Aquinas, to swim against the current and reinstate the demands of 
reason.66 Such tensions would seem to be at the origin of the pervasive modern 
62 Cf. Krister Stendahl, Paul among Jews and Gentiles (London, 1977), 82f.: ‘When the 
period of the European mission had come to an end, the theological and practical center 
of Penance shifted from Baptism, administered once and for all, to the ever repeated 
Mass, and already this subtle change in the architecture of the Christian life contributed 
to a more acute introspection. The manuals for self-examination among the Irish monks 
and missionaries became a treasured legacy in wide circles of Western Christianity. The 
Black Death may have been significant in the development of the climate of faith and 
life. Penetrating self-examination reached a hitherto unknown intensity. For those who 
took this practice seriously—and they were more numerous than many Protestants are 
accustomed to think—the pressure was great. It is as one of those—and for them—that 
Luther carries out his mission as a great pioneer.’ This passage is from a famous article 
of Stendahl’s, ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’, 
Harvard Theological Review, 56 (1963), 199–215, reproduced in the aforementioned 
book, 78–96. 
63 Louth, DCS, 273. 
64 J. Pelikan, The Melody of Theology (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), 173. Bernard himself 
had, seemingly, little direct knowledge of Dionysius, the main channel through which 
the patristic mystical legacy had reached Latin Christendom (Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 564). 
65 Louth, DCS, 273. 
66 Cf. Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 566: ‘According to Thomas . . . we know God, insofar as we 
know him at all, with our reason, and love simply moves our reason to seek him. The 
fullness of knowledge, however, true knowledge of God, is something that will only be 
granted eschatologically in the beatific vision.’ Interestingly, this Dominican tradition, 
with its insistence on the demands of the intellect, continued in Meister Eckhart 
(c.1260–c.1328): ‘It was realized that no one philosophical definition could ever contain 
the One and Triune God, but to search for one was considered the primary and self-
imposed obligation of the intellect. Thomist boldness found eventual fulfilment in the 
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division between the head and the heart, or as Louth himself puts it: ‘In Bernard 
we begin to see a disjunction between knowledge and love, thinking and feeling, 
that was destined to have a profound influence in the West.’67 Indeed, Louth 
detects in Bernard’s separation of knowledge and love perhaps to some extent 
the cause of, rather than simply the reflection of, a new way of regarding human 
nature in the West. In the end only love is essential in uniting human beings to 
God, who is revealed to us above all in the figure of the suffering and crucified 
Christ.68
 
 In the century after Bernard, Thomas Gallus, one of the canons of St-
Victor in Paris,69 before becoming abbot at Vercelli, worked on the writings of 
Dionysius and ‘seems to have been the first to link Dionysius’ apophatic 
theology70 with the idea that the deepest part of the human personality is a non-
mysticism of Meister Eckhart, who was persuaded that man, whose soul retained some 
sparks of the divine intelligence itself, experienced actual divinity through the union of 
his intellect with that of God’ (Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World. Europe from 1100 
to 1350, London, 1974, 268f.). Thus, any presumption of a radical and total distinction 
between ‘scholastic’ and ‘mystical’ thinkers in the medieval period would seem to be an 
over-simplification of the real situation. Franz Overbeck argued that ‘scholasticism’ and 
‘mysticism’ belong together in the Middle Ages, because this was precisely the 
amalgam the early Church bequeathed to the medieval period, and to break with it 
would have been unthinkable for the medievals. The two approaches, or commitments – 
one ‘intellectual’ (wissenschaftlich) and the other ‘religious’ – to Christian doctrine 
were certainly distinct, but both shared, in Overbeck’s image, the one bed (cf. F. 
Overbeck, ‘Scholastik und Mystik’, in Vorgeschichte und Jugend der mittelalterlichen 
Scholastik, ed. C.A. Bernoulli, Darmstadt, 1971, 231–234). This judgement is echoed 
by J. Pelikan: ‘Although in modern times the mystical is often set over against the 
theological and is said to be more authentic or more subjective or simply more 
dithyrambic, the two forms of religious thought can in fact exist side-by-side in the 
same person, as they did in Bernard and in Thomas Aquinas and in many of the other 
scholastics’ (The Melody of Theology , 173). In this context, it is interesting to note 
Cioran’s observation on Eckhart, usually classed only with the ‘mystics’, whom he 
found the most readable, indeed now the only readable, ‘scholastic’: ‘Si Maître Eckhart 
est le seul «scolastique» qu’on puisse lire encore, c’est parce que chez lui la profondeur 
est doublée de charme, de glamour, avantage rare dans les époques de foi intense’ (E.M. 
Cioran, Aveux et Anathèmes, Paris, 1987, 59). To sum up, it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that, for all the tensions, there was no simplistic dichotomy in the 
medieval period between ‘theologians’ and ‘mystics’. Many were both. 
67 Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 123. 
68 Cf. sic affici, deificari est [‘to be moved in this way, is to be deified’: De diligendo Deo 
X 27], cited by Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 564. 
69 Cf. above, n.55. 
70 Apophatic, or negative, theology is ‘a way of approaching God by denying that any of 
our concepts can properly be affirmed of Him. The term is first used by Dionysius the 
Pseudo-Areopagite in contrast with cataphatic or affirmative theology and symbolic 
theology (Mystical Theology, 3)’ (ODCC, 88). 
17 
                                          
intellectual mystical faculty for apprehending God.’71 It was Thomas Gallus also 
who interpreted Dionysius’ ‘celestial hierarchy as being a kind of allegory of the 
stages of the soul’s ascent to God.’72 In thus taking the objectivity of the 
Dionysian ‘celestial hierarchy’, ‘which explains how the nine orders of angels 
mediate God to man’,73 and introjecting it into the individual human soul, 
Thomas Gallus was using ‘Dionysian notions’, against their author’s original 
intention, ‘to explore the inner depths of the individual’, thus contributing ‘to 
the “discovery of the individual”’74 that is, as has already been stressed, such a 
significant feature of medieval culture. For his part, the anonymous fourteenth-
century author of The Cloud of Unknowing ‘was deeply influenced by the anti-
intellectualist interpretation of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, as found in 
Thomas Gallus, and insists that, in this life, God as He is in Himself cannot be 
grasped by the intellect; between Him and us there is always a “cloud of 
unknowing”, which can be pierced only by “a sharp dart of love”.’75
 
  It is, finally, important to bear in mind always that, in the later 
Middle Ages especially, mysticism was not just a response to the changing 
intellectual climate of the times. Powerful other factors were clearly also 
involved, in the shape of the very threats to life itself presented not only by war 
and destruction, but above all by plague. Here the impact of the Black Death 
(c.1350) can hardly be exaggerated. As William McNeill has written: 
 
When the plague was raging, a person might be in full health one day and die 
miserably within twenty-four hours. This utterly discredited any merely human 
effort to explain the mysteries of the world. The confidence in rational theology, 
which characterized the age of Aquinas (d. 1274), could not survive such 
experiences. A world view allowing scope to arbitrary, inexplicable catastrophe 
alone was compatible with the grim reality of plague. Hedonism and revival of 
one or another form of fatalistic pagan philosophy were possible reactions, 
though confined always to a few. Far more popular and respectable was an 
upsurge of mysticism, aimed at achieving encounter with God in inexplicable, 
unpredictable, intense, and purely personal ways. Hesychasm among the 
Orthodox, and more variegated movements among Latin Christians – e.g., the 
practices of the so-called Rhineland mystics, of the Brethren of the Common 
Life, and of heretical groups like the Lollards of England – all gave expression to 
71 ODCC, 1617. Cf. Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 124f. 
72 Louth, ibid., 124. 
73 ODCC, 485. 
74 Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 124. The ‘discovery of the individual’ is an allusion to 
Colin Morris’ book (London, 1976), of the same name. 
75 ODCC, 368. 
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the need for a more personal, antinomian access to God than had been offered by 
Thomist theology and the previously recognized forms of piety.76
 
 
Continuities and contrasts between patristic and subsequent mysticism 
 
 
The shift from the objective mysticism of the Fathers, who showed scant interest 
in the subjective accompaniments of the mystical life, to the ‘subjective 
mysticism’ of medieval and subsequent times with its increasing preoccupation 
with the inner life of the individual mystic, seems to call into question for a 
scholar like Andrew Louth whether one is justified in using the same word for 
the two realities. However, despite the burgeoning of subjective mystical 
phenomena, such as visionary experiences, recorded in the medieval period 
especially in the writings of women like Bridget of Sweden (1303–1373), 
Catherine of Siena (1347–1380), and Julian of Norwich (c. 1342–1420), Louth 
also notes genuine links between such writers and what one might call the 
‘classical mysticism’ of the Fathers because, for instance, of ‘the quality of 
engagement in the mystery of Christ’s death and victory evinced especially by 
the Showings.’77
 
 But Teresa of Ávila unwittingly and unintentionally, in Louth’s 
judgement, was to open the way for a concentration on the experiential, even 
psychological, dimension of mysticism, through the manner in which she 
discussed different stages of prayer (‘prayer of recollection, prayer of quiet, 
prayer of union’)78 in relation to ‘the psychological characteristics of such 
76 W.H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, (Harmondsworth, 1979), 172f. 
77 Louth, DCS, 273. 
78 Louth, ibid. Cf. J. Pelikan, op. cit., 174: ‘Teresa attempted to identify the “prayer of 
quiet” and the “prayer of union” as stages between ordinary prayer and the spiritual 
marriage of the soul with Christ, in which the will of the mystic and the will of God 
become one.’ Pelikan implies that John of the Cross was more ‘successful in 
schematizing the steps of mystical ascent, because he combined a poetic sensibility to 
the nuances of mystical experience with a theological and philosophical precision 
shaped by a study of Thomas Aquinas’ (ibid.). See also ODCC, 1128: ‘Late medieval 
writers stressed that the height of the Christian life could be understood only by 
experience, and “mystical theology” was increasingly taken to mean an experiential 
knowledge of God. Some writers specified particular subjective experiences as 
constituting or indicating the attainment of “mystical theology” (generally identified, 
from the 16th century onwards, with contemplation); this process reached its apogee in 
the Carmelite doctors, Teresa of Ávila and St John of the Cross, whose influence 
thereafter predominates.’ 
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states.’79 If then the subjective, psychological dimension of mysticism becomes 
paramount, it is only a short step to seeing human beings as all naturally – or 
psychologically – capable of mystical experience. Psychologically observable 
mystical phenomena can then be studied comparatively across religions and 
cultures.80
 
 There seems, at any rate, to be a broad consensus that by the seventeenth 
century the older designation, ‘mystical theology’, had been replaced by the 
modern terms – ‘la mystique’, in French; ‘mística’, in Spanish81 – and the term 
‘mystic’, formerly only used as an adjective, starts to be used as a substantive.82 
All of these changes in usage point in the direction of a greater concern with 
‘religious experience’ for its own sake, as a supposedly autonomous subject of 
study, and with the different individuals claiming to be the subjects of such 
experience. Almost inevitably, the original connection between biblical 
revelation and ‘mysticism’ grew ever weaker, with fateful consequences in the 
view of Hans Urs von Balthasar.83 To take just one example mentioned by 
Balthasar, the development in France from the seventeenth century onwards of 
‘the so-called affective theology of the baroque, which is objectively already 
79 Louth, DCS, 273. 
80 Cf. Louth, DCS, 274. 
81 The case with English would not appear to be very different. According to The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed., vol. 1, Oxford, 1950, 1306), in English the 
adjective ‘mystic’ is not found until the seventeenth century (1615), in reference to ‘the 
ancient religious mysteries’, and a little later (1639) in reference to ‘that branch of 
theology which relates to the direct communion of the soul with God’; not until the 
nineteenth century is it used to mean ‘inspiring an awed sense of mystery’ (1842). As a 
substantive (i.e. a ‘mystic’) it is found in 1679 referring to ‘a “mystic doctor”, an 
exponent of mystical theology . . . one who seeks by contemplation and self-surrender 
to obtain union with or absorption into the Deity, or who believes in the spiritual 
apprehension of truths inaccessible to the understanding.’ The modern noun ‘mysticism’ 
is not found until the eighteenth century (1736), with the following range of interrelated 
meanings: ‘The opinions, mental tendencies, or habits of thought and feeling, 
characteristic of mystics; belief in the possibility of union with the Divine nature by 
means of ecstatic contemplation; reliance on spiritual intuition as the means of 
acquiring knowledge of mysteries inaccessible to the understanding.’ 
82 Santiago Guerra, for example, writes (art. ‘Mística’ in Diccionario Teológico: El Dios 
Cristiano, 898): ‘In both paganism and in the Christian Church up until the seventeenth 
century the term mystical was used only as an adjective qualifying a noun. In the 
seventeenth century the noun “mysticism” [mística in Spanish] first appeared in the 
history of Western spirituality, and referred directly to a specific interior experience . . . 
From then until now the subjective, psychological and experiential aspect of mysticism 
has been to the forefront in discussions of the topic.’ See also ODCC, 1128; Louth, 
‘Mystik II’, 547. 
83 See his ‘The Unity of Theology and Spirituality’, published in Convergences: To the 
Source of Christian Mystery, tr. E.A. Nelson (San Francisco, 1983), 17–45. 
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what the nineteenth century will call “spirituality”,’ encouraged a kind of 
religion in which ‘the concern is essentially for the progress of the devout, pious 
self, . . . Henri Bremond was able to summarize the whole splendid and yet 
secretly tragic history of this era under the horrible, fundamentally 
Schleiermacherian title of Histoire du sentiment religieux en France . . .’84
 
 The growth of interest in mysticism in more modern times can, 
furthermore, perhaps best be understood – in the West at least – as part of the 
wider appeal to experience ‘as a way of establishing or assessing religious 
claims,’85 and thus as part of a general turn to what one might call the ‘authority 
of experience’ in the post-Enlightenment world, a process from which religion 
did not, and probably could not, remain exempt. Indeed religion may have been 
the crucial driving force behind this movement, in so far as it sought to 
overcome the perceived barrenness of the rationalism of the Aufklärung by 
appealing to and exploring – some might say, exploiting – the existential depths 
and uncertainties and indeterminacy of the human condition. A key figure here 
is J.G. Hamann (1730–1788),86 ‘the father of Sturm und Drang’87 whose protest 
against the Enlightenment was of incalculable influence on later German 
thought. And his protest was religiously, or ‘mystically’ inspired, as Frederick 
Beiser explains: 
 
It was during his Bible reading that Hamann had his shattering mystical 
experience. On the evening of March 31, 1758, he read from the fifth book of 
Moses: “The earth opened the mouth of Cain to receive the blood of Abel.” 
Reflecting upon this passage, Hamann felt his heart pound, his hands tremble. In a 
convulsive flood of tears he realized that he was “the murderer of his brother,” “the 
murderer of God’s only begotten son,” Christ himself. He began to feel the spirit of 
God working through him, revealing “the mystery of love” and “the blessing of 
faith in Christ.” 
 After hearing the voice of God inside himself, and after reading the Bible in his 
personal and allegorical way, Hamann came to believe that God was always 
communicating with him, if he would only listen.88
 
With Hamann, the ostensibly self-authenticating power of ‘mystical experience’ 
threatened to banish from religion alternative modes of argumentation. And 
84 Balthasar, Convergences, 35. 
85 Louth, DCS, 274. 
86 On Hamann, see Isaiah Berlin, The Magus of the North. J.G. Hamann and the Origins 
of Modern Irrationalism (London, 1994). 
87 Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 18. 
88 Beiser, op. cit., 20. 
21 
                                          
indeed from Schleiermacher89 onwards religious thinkers have sought to 
legitimate (as the saying now goes) their claims about the truth of their 
theologies by appealing directly to ‘religious’ or ‘mystical’ experience. 
 
 
Official suspicion of mysticism in Catholicism and Protestantism 
 
 
Although we have stressed the persistence, indeed the growth of mystical 
tendencies in the post-medieval Christian world, it would, of course, be quite 
wrong to think that such growth was unchallenged or universally welcomed. In 
both the Catholic and Protestant worlds, enormous resistance was called forth by 
mysticism, even though it must also be said that in the case of Catholicism, 
official approval was eventually given to the great Spanish Carmelite mystics, 
Teresa of Ávila (1515–82) and John of the Cross (1542–91). The former was 
canonized in 1622, and declared a Doctor of the Church in 1970, whereas the 
latter was beatified in 1675, canonized in 1726, and two hundred years later 
declared a Doctor of the Church. But mysticism tended to be scorned by many, 
especially in the Reformed tradition, as being subjective, self-indulgent, and 
almost oblivious to the Cross of Jesus Christ. In this context, one sometimes 
hears variations of the cynical remark about mysticism as ‘beginning in mist 
(myst-), centering in an “I” (-i-), and ending in schism (-cism).’90
 
 To take some specific cases, the Catholic Church in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, for instance, was extremely alarmed at illuminist 
tendencies among the alumbrados in Spain, and at the spread of ‘Quietism’ in 
France. Bossuet, the Bishop of Meaux, bitterly attacked Fénelon and Madame 
Guyon and helped bring about their condemnation on charges of Quietism. The 
fear aroused in men like Bossuet by such movements was that they could have 
amoral consequences for society, and, more pertinently, lead to a bypassing of 
established Church structures and authority in the fleshing out of the human 
89 It is curious that even in Eastern Christianity, in other ways so different from the 
Christianity of the Reformed Churches in the West, ‘a striking renewal of interest in 
mystical theology’ occurred, as Kallistos Ware points out (in H. Cunliffe-Jones, ed., A 
History of Christian Doctrine, Edinburgh, 1978, 455), in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, in the ‘Hesychast Renaissance’. [Hesychasm was ‘the tradition of 
inner, mystical prayer associated above all with the monks of Mount Athos. Its distant 
origins extend back to the 4th–5th centuries . . . Hesychasm in its developed form finds 
full expression in the works of . . . especially St Gregory Palamas . . . of the 14th 
century’ (ODCC, 763).] Cf. Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 576f. 
90 Dennis Tamburello, O.F.M., Ordinary Mysticism (N.Y./Mahwah, N.J., 1996), 7. 
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relationship to God.91 Catholic fear of mysticism was, in short, institutionally 
motivated: if God could be reached privately, so to speak, without recourse to 
the sacraments or religious services and practices approved and organised by the 
Church, that would obviously in the long run threaten to make the Church 
redundant. 
 
 The hostility to mysticism on the Protestant side had a somewhat different 
rationale, and was possibly more theologically entrenched. So much so, in fact, 
that some Protestant writers have even challenged the view that Christian 
mysticism is possible. Yet, as Andrew Louth points out, a book entitled The 
Protestant Mystics was written to refute the charge that ‘there are no Protestant 
mystics.’92 However, the reluctance to embrace mysticism, noted earlier in the 
case of Barth, is theologically deeply-rooted in the basic Protestant doctrine of 
justification by faith alone. Yet the situation is much more complex than any 
simple antithesis between ‘justification’ and ‘mysticism’ could suggest. 
 
 The statement, for example, by Friedrich Heer: ‘The mystics’ theme is 
that men should look for the kingdom of God within themselves’,93 could be 
seen as encapsulating the way in which Martin Luther’s Reformation was at one 
and the same time indebted to,94 and yet implacably hostile to, the German 
tradition of mysticism. On the one hand, mysticism fostered interiority,95 and 
91 Cf. Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 574. Bossuet was also, interestingly, against any supposedly 
selfless love of God, which mystically inclined thinkers are prone to recommend, 
arguing that while God may be ‘the highest Good’, he is ‘also my highest Good’ (ibid.). 
92 Louth, Origins, xii, in reference to Anne Fremantle and W.H. Auden, The Protestant 
Mystics (London, 1964) vii, quoting W.T. Stace. 
93 F. Heer, op. cit., 370. 
94 See Sidney Painter, A History of the Middle Ages 284–1500 (London, 1973), 420f. 
Luther himself published an edition of the Theologia Germanica. It is now (a critical 
text was published in 1982) thought that ‘the work comes from the milieu of the Friends 
of God associated with Eckhart and J. Tauler, whose doctrines it reflects’ (ODCC, 
1604). But Luther’s relationship with his own German religious tradition is clearly not 
straightforward (cf., for example, Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, New York, 1962, 
189). 
95 It is in this interiority that many commentators have seen the root of much that is 
admirable and much that is disastrous in German culture. The dilemma of modern 
German culture, which valued inwardness over politics, was touched on by Thomas 
Mann in a lecture delivered to a group of republican students in Munich in 1923: ‘The 
finest characteristic of the typical German, the best-known and also the most flattering 
to his self-esteem, is his inwardness . . . The inwardness, the culture (Bildung) of a 
German implies introspectiveness; an individualistic cultural conscience; consideration 
for the careful tending, the shaping, deepening and perfecting of one’s own personality 
or, in religious terms, for the salvation and justification of one’s own life; subjectivism 
in the things of the mind, therefore, a type of culture that might be called pietistic, given 
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Luther was nothing if not a man with a volcanic inner life; and the German 
mystical tradition fostered the German vernacular too, and this was to be the 
instrument of Luther’s great liberating and awesome influence.96 On the other 
hand, the Reformers stressed the idea of justification by faith alone. Hence, 
mystical talk of human transformation, to say nothing of union with God, they 
could not but regard as profoundly suspect.97 Consequently, even Tauler’s attack 
on the externals of religion – ‘Churches make no man holy, but men make 
churches holy’98 – was still miles away from Luther’s sense of man’s utter 
sinfulness and radical need of justification from a transcendent, all holy, and 
gracious God. And indeed, ‘Protestant theologians, from M. Luther onwards, 
have tended to regard mysticism with suspicion. E. Brunner and R. Niebuhr held 
it to be anti-Christian because of its close link with Neoplatonism, which 
seemed to bring it closer to pagan gnosis than to the Gospel’s offer of salvation; 
others feared dangers of pantheism.’99
 
 Harvey Egan, a prominent Catholic writer on mysticism, makes the same 
point: ‘For those influenced by the Continental-European Protestant theologians, 
such as Ritschl, Troeltsch, Nygren, von Harnack, Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann, 
mysticism means little more than Greek-infested, heretical Christianity.’100 The 
same writer makes similar observations in his An Anthology of Christian 
Mysticism, with reference to theologians in the Protestant tradition: 
 
Influential theologians, including Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Friedrich Heiler, 
Albrecht Ritschl, Nathan Söderblom, Ernst Troeltsch, and Adolf Harnack, . . . 
sharply distinguish biblical, prophetic religions from Oriental mystical religions, 
claiming that the two are mutually exclusive. Moreover, these authors reject the 
longstanding Christian mystical tradition as a pagan, neo-Platonic infection and 
deformation of Christianity, or as Roman Catholic piety in an extreme form. 
 
Consequently: 
to autobiographical confession and deeply personal, one in which the world of the 
objective, the political world, is felt to be profane and is thrust aside with indifference, 
“because”, as Luther says, “this external order is of no consequence”’ (quoted by W.H. 
Bruford, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation, Cambridge, 1975, vii). It would 
seem that the source of this problem lies further back than Luther, in the medieval 
German mystical tradition itself (see below, n.110). 
96 Cf. Erikson, op. cit., 195. 
97 Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 571. 
98 From a sermon preached at the consecration of Cologne Cathedral in 1357, in which he 
took as his theme that ‘the true consecration of churches . . . was a rite to be celebrated 
within “the inward-turning man”’ (see Heer, op. cit., 371). 
99 ODCC, 1127. 
100 H. Egan, S.J., What Are They Saying About Mysticism? (New York/Ramsey, 1982), 1. 
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From this perspective, Christian mysticism is a contradiction in terms. According 
to these thinkers, genuine Christian faith should reject mysticism as a ‘work,’ 
‘law,’ or ‘religion’ in the most pejorative sense. Barth typifies this view when he 
considers mysticism as more pernicious than even self-righteous Pharisaism . . . 
101
 
 Barth himself deals, somewhat provocatively, with ‘mysticism’ as a form 
of ‘Religion as Unbelief’ (‘atheism’ falls under the same rubric), in Church 
Dogmatics, I, 2.102 He interprets mysticism as really not opposed to the 
established religions it is often seen as attacking, since all such religions are, for 
Barth, in fact the offspring of mystical impulses. Yet he does, perhaps 
paradoxically, also have a strong sense of the ‘mystery’ of Christianity, in tune 
with his insistence on divine transcendence, but seems to fear that this mystery 
would be dissolved or illegitimately appropriated by any move in the direction 
of ‘mysticism’. He writes, for instance, in Church Dogmatics: ‘Mysterium 
signifies not simply the hiddenness of God, but rather His becoming manifest in 
a hidden, i.e. in a non-apparent way, which gives information not directly but 
indirectly. Mysterium is the veiling of God in which He meets us by actually 
unveiling Himself to us: because He will not and cannot unveil Himself to us in 
any other way than by veiling Himself.’103 This view of the divine mysterium of 
Christianity seems to preserve the traditional emphasis upon the 
incomprehensibility or hiddenness of God, even – indeed perhaps especially – in 
his revelation, and to be in fact not essentially out of harmony with an important 
aspect of the ‘mysticism’ of the Fathers. 
 
 
Concluding observations 
 
 
101 Collegeville, Minn., 1991, XXV. It might be worth noting in passing a difference 
between the original German and the English translation of the Barth reference Egan 
gives at this point (to the ‘excluding’ of mysticism). The reference in question is to The 
Epistle to the Romans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 109-110). The 
English version reads as if mysticism has to be repudiated by genuine believers 
themselves, whereas what the German version (Der Römerbrief, Zürich, 1976 [1940], 
84) actually claims is that mysticism – for Barth a form of fake Pharisaic humility – will 
at the heel of the hunt ensure that its practitioners themselves will be ‘“turned away” 
from the gates of the righteousness of God’. The veiled threat – or at least the hint about 
the ‘danger’ of ‘mysticism’ – implied in Barth’s assertion is lost in the translation. 
102 C.D., I, 2, 318–325. 
103 C.D., I, 1, 188 (quoted by Colin Brown, Karl Barth and the Christian Message, 
London, 1967, 51). 
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In outlining briefly the history of Christian mysticism, attention was drawn to 
the difference perceived between patristic and all subsequent mysticism. 
Mysticism in the early period was said to be ‘objective’, but since the medieval 
period, to have become more involved with ‘human experience’. This tendency 
was seen to have gathered momentum since the Enlightenment, with mysticism 
becoming increasingly subjective. We now must look a little more closely at 
whether this broad picture is entirely fair. 
 
 While it may indeed be plausible to claim that the earlier form of 
mysticism is objective and concerned with our approach to, and participation in, 
the objective mystery of redemption in Christ, nevertheless, even this ‘objective’ 
mysticism, if it is to claim legitimately the title of Christian, surely has to be 
able to answer the suspicion104 that it was one strategy that early Christians 
adopted in order to try to overcome the difficulty created by the absence, or at 
least delay, of the parousia. 
 
 When Christianity encountered ‘mystical’ Platonism, its expectation of 
the parousia – or the ‘Second Coming’, the return of Christ in glory, bringing 
history to an end – had not yet been realised.105 It is tempting to wonder whether 
a mystical Platonism may, in fact, have pointed Christian thinkers towards a 
way forward out of the embarrassment of the (albeit only temporary) non-
fulfilment of their hope. By concentrating on the ‘mystical’ approach to 
Christian faith, the Fathers found not exactly a substitute for, but an attractive 
complement, as it were, to the parousia, which did no longer then have to be 
thought of as immediately imminent. Furthermore, if one thinks of the situation 
in the fourth century, when Christianity ceased to be persecuted and began to 
enjoy state protection, when the fervour of early days seemed lost or waning, 
then an intensely lived mystical form of Christianity may well have seemed a 
credible way of asserting its otherworldly identity. 
 
104 Suggested, to this writer, by the writings of Franz Overbeck (1837–1905). 
105 Balthasar explains the non-occurrence of the parousia as a ‘misunderstanding’ on the 
part of Christ’s earliest followers: ‘[T]he unique event of Christ, who in his earthly 
existence lives in anticipation of an end of time (for he bears the sin of the world, also 
of future generations), is in his call to discipleship opened up to other men. They receive 
a share in his anticipation of and in his responsibility for the future (the first disciples’ 
chronological expectation of an early end was a misunderstanding [die chronologische 
Naherwartung der ersten Jünger war ein Mißverständnis]); they no longer confront this 
future merely as the abyss of empty possibility or as something utopian and impossible’ 
(Elucidations, tr. J. Riches, London, 1975, 54f. [=Klarstellungen, Einsiedeln, 1978, 
57]). 
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 This suggestion may be somewhat strengthened, if one recalls that other 
means were also adopted by the early Church to keep its otherworldly ideals 
alive, some of which intersected with mysticism. One such other strategy – or, 
perhaps more accurately, another aspect of the same strategy – could be seen in 
the abandonment of interest in the world (cf. the de contemptu mundi theme, that 
was to have such a long and distinguished career in Christian tradition) and 
corresponding concentration on the reality of death, a path pioneered by the first 
monks.106 Even the Pelagian movement that began in St Augustine’s time can 
perhaps be seen as another way of trying to prevent Christianity from being 
swallowed up by a state-protected, domesticated Church, ravaged by a dismal, 
soul-destroying worldliness. 
 
 If this is in fact so, it would seem to have set a pattern for Christian 
history. For whenever Christianity has been in trouble (and when is it not in 
trouble in this world?) it has been forced to try find new ways – such as 
renewing belief in an imminent end of the present world order107 – of making 
dramatic or ‘felt’ contact with God, so to speak, in order to avoid disappearance. 
‘Mysticism’ would then seem to be one of the more enduring means of trying to 
achieve this purpose. 
 
 If, to repeat, the hunch is correct that mysticism appears, or at least 
interest in mysticism seems to increase, when Christianity is in difficulties, then 
it might be argued that the mysticism of, say, a Bernard of Clairvaux was an 
instinctive, defensive response to the emergence of a more rational theology, 
represented by Abelard (1079–1142/3). For such a theology threatened to drive 
a potentially lethal wedge between ‘dogmatic and mystical theology, or theology 
and “spirituality”’, to quote Thomas Merton.108 This was a separation not 
existing seemingly in the patristic period, but destined to widen throughout the 
Middle Ages, and beyond. The Fathers, of course, one might add, did not have 
Islam to contend with, whereas for the medieval scholastics Islam was a 
powerfully organised, monotheistic religion complete with a prestigious 
philosophical theology, firmly ensconced in the Mediterranean world, and 
posing an obvious threat – or at the very least, an alternative – to Christianity, 
that could not simply be ignored.109 The intellectual response to Islam may then 
106 There could, of course, as was mentioned above, be overlap, as in the mysticism of the 
monks. 
107 See the vast array of evidence assembled by Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the 
Millennium (London, 1978). 
108 As cited by Louth, Origins, xi–xii. 
109 The Summa contra Gentiles (1259–1264) of St Thomas Aquinas, for example, can, in 
the light of medieval Christendom’s awareness of Islam, be regarded as ‘part of the 
Christian intellectual reaction against Arabian intellectual culture, and especially against 
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itself have been perceived as threatening to bring about a potentially dangerous 
distortion of the Christian faith, and this in turn might have helped to prompt a 
‘mystical’ correction or ‘backlash’. 
 
 To take another example, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the 
desolate state of German lands, brought on by the strife between Pope and 
Emperor, may have produced by reaction the flowering of German mysticism 
associated above all with the name of Meister Eckhart.110 One could continue. 
The rise of the great mystics of Spain’s ‘Golden Age’ may have been a 
protective reaction by those who did not want their religion commandeered by 
the forces of the State for the latter’s own self-aggrandisement. This represents a 
characteristic Christian move, if one may so put it, since Christianity’s refusal to 
be identified with, or limited to, any this-worldly ambition, however glamorous 
it might appear, is an expression of its eschatological commitments. 
 
 Sometimes, too, mysticism can take the form of a limitless love, provoked 
by and seeking to triumph over seemingly limitless horror, as the only way of 
doing so, and in the conviction that it can do so: thus Quietism has been 
interpreted by Ian Sellers ‘as an introverted and mystical reaction to the 
Arabian Aristotelianism’ (A.C. Pegis, in Saint Thomas Aquinas, On the truth of the 
Catholic Faith. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God, trans., with an Intro. and 
Notes, by Anton C. Pegis, New York, 1955, 21). 
110 Cf. the penetrating observations of Friedrich Heer: ‘The mysticism of Meister Eckhart, 
Mechthild of Magdeburg, Tauler and Suso, was the answer of inspired and devout men 
and women to the spiritual destitution which threatened with the collapse of Empire and 
Church. . . . The great age of German mysticism . . . ran parallel with the decline of the 
Empire and were a function of it. The years of the Interregnum, 1256–73, “the terrible 
years without an Emperor”, coincided with the youth of Meister Eckhart’ (op. cit., 366). 
What was heavy with consequences for the future development of Germany, it might be 
worth noting in passing, according to Heer’s analysis, is the fact that, ‘the response of 
the Germans to the political and ecclesiastical miseries of the thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries was very different from that of the great Florentine [Dante] and of 
the men around Wyclif and Hus, all of whom attacked the problem from the outside, in 
the context of the political and ecclesiastical life of their countries. German mysticism 
was entirely inward, a delving into the “inner kingdom”; the mystics’ all-in-all was a 
cosmos which was an inner kingdom of the soul’ (ibid., 367). The eventual response by 
the authorities to the movement thus started was ‘the attempt to exterminate German 
mysticism and all its offshoots’ (371). But ‘German mysticism, although driven 
underground, yet remained fertile; there sprang from it German poetry and song, both 
secular and religious, German philosophy and speculation. This is a literature of the 
“resistance”, resistance to the ghost of the Holy Empire, to its heir the sovereign state, 
and to their allies, the official Church and the official faith. The flaw which separates 
the outer from the inner kingdom, power from spirit, . . . politicians from intellectuals, 
and which has been so tragic in its effects on German history, had here its point of 
origin’ (371). See also above, n.95. 
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dogmatism and oppressions of the Thirty Years’ War’.111 And at roughly the 
same time, in Germany, Quietism encouraged the emergence of ‘Pietism’, a 
movement that attempted to resist the deadening effect of a rigid, over-
institutionalised Lutheran orthodoxy. 
 
 At a later stage, as we saw, the more experiential or ‘mystical’ approach 
to Christianity is dramatically exemplified by J.G. Hamann, a forerunner of the 
Romantics, and one of the first to attack the shortcomings of the Enlightenment. 
Following on from such rumblings of discontent with the Aufklärung, 
Schleiermacher, sometimes classified as a mystical thinker,112 inaugurated a new 
epoch of theological apologetics by stressing the experiential truth of religion, 
thus attempting to rescue Christianity from obliteration by Enlightenment 
rationalism. The use of mysticism as an apologetic weapon against “the 
prevalent arid rationalism and materialism”113 can also be observed in Catholic 
writers over the past hundred years. 
 
 To sum up, if ‘mysticism’ can in fact plausibly be interpreted as a reactive 
tendency in the history of Christianity (like prophecy in the history of Israel?), if 
it can be understood as a compelling and resourceful means of coping with 
varying situations of crisis, is it then possibly, at heart, a subterfuge? Is it, in 
short, an attempt to escape from an intolerable world, somehow to transcend 
history in the here and now, which all religions in one way or another wish to 
do, and thus paradoxically to make life endurable?114 And furthermore, just as an 
acute awareness of death, and an abandonment of earthly ambitions or even 
interests, can be found in many religions and world views, so ‘mysticism’ can be 
found in many places outside Christianity. There is, it could be argued, nothing 
specifically Christian about it, except perhaps in its patristic phase, when it 
might still conceivably be seen as an inspired and creative attempt to find a new 
way of keeping Christian faith alive in the face of the failure – in the short run, 
at any rate – of Christ’s parousia to materialise. Or, if one were to see the early 
Church itself as arising in response to the non-occurrence of the parousia, then 
111 Art. ‘Quietism’ in J.D. Douglas, ed., The New International Dictionary of the Christian 
Church (Exeter, 1974), 818. 
112 He is included, for instance, in John Ferguson, An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of 
Mysticism and the Mystery Religions, (London, 1976), 164f. 
113 David Knowles, What is Mysticism? (London, 1976), 11. 
114 The language of these remarks was suggested by an observation the great classical 
scholar E. R. Dodds made in his autobiography, Missing Persons (Oxford, 1977). On 
visiting Mount Athos in 1951 he was struck by the appearance of gradual disintegration 
the monasteries presented by that time, and remarked: ‘One day, I could not but feel, 
Athos must perish, and with it one more experiment in the art of enduring life’ (op. cit., 
185). 
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mysticism could perhaps be seen as a profound attempt to re-christianise the 
Church, as it were, or to transcend it, through the search for immediate contact 
with God.115 On this interpretation, the motivation or inspiration of subsequent, 
and especially modern, Western mysticism would of course be less focused, less 
specific, more diffuse. As against this line of argument, defenders of the 
legitimacy of Christian mysticism often point out that, over and over again, it is 
the practical life of charity and virtue (surely a quintessentially Christian 
concern) that is stressed as indispensable, as certainly more important ultimately 
than any extraordinary ‘interior’ experiences, by the most sublime of the 
mystics.116 The latter do not typically seek some frantic compensation for 
frustrated eschatological hopes or some escape from the world in the security of 
vivid ‘religious experience’, but rather desire to live out practically the divine 
life of charity in the world in which they find themselves. 
 
 But it is still always important to remember that mysticism is not unique 
to Christianity. And indeed in Christianity, as elsewhere, it seems to have the 
note of ‘immediacy’ about it, which Andrew Louth considers to be central to all 
mysticism: ‘[Mysticism] can be characterized as a search for and experience of 
immediacy with God. The mystic is not content to know about God, he longs for 
union with God. . . . [T]he search for God, or the ultimate, for His own sake, and 
an unwillingness to be satisfied with anything less than Him; the search for 
115 The problem of maintaining the vigour and purity of Christian faith against the 
pressures of historical reality is, of course, as old as Christianity itself. Kolakowski’s 
sobering assessment of the (inevitable?) compromises demanded of religious idealism 
by human, all too human reality, is worth noting. With reference to Kolakowski’s book: 
Chrétiens sans Église (Religious Consciousness and Church Structure, Studies on 
Nondenominational Christianity of the Seventeenth Century, 1965) Czeslaw Milosz 
writes: ‘This is an investigation, unique in its thoroughness, of mystical currents in 
Holland and France, with an awesome array of footnotes. The author’s conclusions may 
be stated as follows: Religious movements, as they gather strength, are confronted at a 
given moment with a choice; they can either organize themselves as churches, impose 
orthodoxy upon their members, and betray their initial, genuine impetus or try to 
preserve their original purity, but then the price is disintegration and disappearance’ (C. 
Milosz, The History of Polish Literature, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983, 518). In the 
light of such a judgement, could it be argued that Christian ‘mysticism’ is a frequently 
occurring and ingenious attempt one finds in the history of the Church to square the 
religious circle, i.e. to recover the ‘original purity’, without provoking ‘disintegration 
and disappearance’? 
116 As in the case, for instance, of Teresa of Ávila (cf. Louth, ‘Mystik II’, 572), whose 
emphasis on ‘God’s desire to be present with the creation’ (Rowan Williams, Teresa of 
Avila, 158) is of a piece with this outlook. Cf. also the article ‘Liebe’ in P. Dinzelbacher 
(ed.), Wörterbuch der Mystik (Stuttgart, 1998), 323ff. 
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immediacy with this object of the soul’s longing: this would seem to be the heart 
of mysticism.’117
 
 Yet the fact that mysticism may be a response to a religious crisis, that it 
is found beyond the frontiers of Christendom, that it comes in many varieties—
none of this should be taken to imply that it will not bring followers of the 
Christian faith into contact with God. But it does suggest that what is uniquely 
Christian is not identifiable, without remainder, with mysticism. In short, even 
Christian mysticism must recognise that the End is not yet, that the parousia has 
not yet happened, that the gap between what we are and what we are to be still 
remains unbridged. Mysticism, in other words, does not have to be rejected as 
anti-Christian or alien to Christianity, but neither can it be taken as ‘the essence 
of Christianity’. 
 
117 Origins, xv. 
